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Description of the technical solution:
Computer networks are facing unprecedented security risks. Dramatically impacting threats are now
targeting our critical infrastructures, such as :
• massive denial of services in the Internet because of lacking security in the Internet of Things
(IoT),
• or, the recent ransomware campaign that spreads all over the world.
The need of security mechanisms is now inevitable to maintain the system. This target can be
performed thanks to a set of now mature security protocols, but it will only succeed if we achieve the
required security management of the multiplying seamless endpoints that do not allow any human
interaction.
The following solution addresses this requirement of trust management.
Secured communications of IP based protocols are usually performed with the help of TLS transport
layer protocol. TLS requires the use of digital certificates to enable (at least) the server
authentication from connecting clients, which in turn must have a trust store containing the
corresponding server public certificate prior to the client-server connection.
While this became the standard architecture, we will illustrate the solution in the field of IP
Telephony which is a core business market for some companies. In VoIP technology, TLS based
application protocols are used to secure the signaling link, while media link is usually secured thanks
to SRTP protocol. TLS protocol requires the use of digital certificates as developed in the following.
In this description, we will use the following definitions:
➢ Client is a device connecting to a server with a TLS based protocol; clients must have trust
stores containing public certificates thus enabling TLS connection to succeed after a server
certificate verification.
➢ Server is a device that receives connection requests from clients; server must have a digital
server certificate for enabling the TLS connection and proving its identity thanks to TLS
authentication mechanisms.
➢ CTL, Certificate Trust List, is a content of public certificates to be imported in clients trust
store and that is used by clients to perform servers authentication.
➢ Secure installation denotes a network of connecting clients and a server that rely on the use
of any kind of TLS based protocols where the server is authenticated by clients.
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➢ On the contrary, an unsecure installation denotes a network where no security protocol –
TLS– is enabled.
➢ A locked-in secure installation, is a secure installation where clients have trust store
configured to contain a given server public certificate, and by extension will not trust any
other unknown server certificate, nor accept trust store modification as explained here
below.
In a locked-in secure installation, clients are not supposed to accept any modification of their trust
store from unknown sources for security reasons. Without such protection an attack can be
performed by tampering with the client trust store in order to inject trust with a rogue server. Such
attack is thus prevented by restricting trust store modifications with CTL that are only originated by
the already known secure server/context. This principle forms a chain of trust where the CTL are all
linked with the previous and the next one within a consistent security context.
This trust store protection however sets the following drawback: if the security configuration
information is lost on server side and no backup is available, the security context that forms the chain
of trust is lost and all clients configured with it are stuck with a lost configuration. Any modification of
their trust store would not be possible with any CTL that could not be linked to their previous one.
In consequence, solutions must be found to allow recovery (or at least reset), especially for large
networks of client devices. The capability to allow quick recovery and to avoid manual actions on
each client is paramount. Both these properties, secure and automated, must be guaranteed so this
procedure cannot be used undeservedly to set back the security of valid secured systems. Massive
updates of clients trust store must be considered as a last-resort and a controlled solution for
networks being blocked because of a loss of server security configuration or context.
Again, the solution to this problem must be under the strict control of the customer and possibly a
technical support resource from the device vendor; only the customer knows that its network is in a
situation that requires performing this massive update, and prevents any attacker to mess with its
locked-in secure installation.
In situations where the chain of trust is lost and all clients configured with it cannot connect anymore
to their communication server, most common solutions range from cumbersome procedures that do
not easily scale, to solutions that sacrifice solution security to ease managing such cases. These
solutions can be detailed as follows:
➢ Remove security context thru a manual action performed by an administrator locally on the
phone. This is generally done from a local configuration menu on the terminal, which access
it restricted to authorized admin persons so security cannot be disabled trivially. Access to
such configuration typically requires entering an admin password. A menu to erase the
security context is then proposed and results in the terminal to come back to its initial mode.
In case of large site experiencing the loss-of-trust-chain issue, this operation requires the
admin to intervene on all terminals, possibly on a large amount of geographical sites. This
makes the recovery procedure long and costly, and leaves the telephony solution out of
service for a duration that can cause significant business impacts for the end-customer. Such
procedures are applied in some solutions.

2

http://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/592

3

KREET and NOGUEIRA: Trust Chain Recovery Method For Secured Connected Devices Solutio

➢ As a variant, it is possible to reset the phone to factory settings thru more of less constraining
procedures. This can be done by accessing a local menu as on the previous solution, keeping
the same level of constraint and relative security against unauthorized security deactivation.
It can alternatively be based on a hardware procedure consisting in either a key sequence, or
reset button, that can however quite easily be known by anyone. This still requires an
individual action on each set, and in the second case opens the solution to security threats as
anyone could easily deactivate security and possibly insert as man-in-the-middle when
activating security again, making terminal trust rogue authorities.
➢ Finally, a theoretical possibility is to authorize endpoint to automatically accept any new
authority even if it cannot be verified by the chain of trust stored locally. This solution of
course does not protect against man-in-the-middle intrusions, and cannot be considered
relevant on security standpoint. Prompting end-user on acceptance of unknown server
certificate, as may happen on web browsers, cannot be considered a valid generic solution
neither, considering that the terminals UI can be limited and capability to display relevant
information might not be present and moreover that users might simply accept whatever
message gets displayed by lack of understanding of what is exactly at stake.
The proposed procedure addresses shortcoming of existing solutions.
It enables an automated distribution of a recovery token resetting “stale” security context to all
endpoints, requiring no per-set intervention. Instead of intervening on all endpoint, the solution
administrator interfaces with the terminals’ vendor by providing a piece of information that is signed
by the vendor, and returned to the admin. This recovery token is then injected in a configuration file
that all endpoints automatically get during their standard startup procedures. The time to recover is
limited to this interaction with the vendor support services, i.e. a matter of minutes rather than
hours or days.
Although automatized, it maintains security properties of the solution by ensuring that the recovery
token can only be emitted by the endpoint vendor and for authorized entities that the vendor can
authenticate. It also limits the scope of the recovery token to a specific customer installation only, so
re-using the recovery token on another system than the one is was requested for has no impact and
brings no risk of degrading security.
Our solution provides a way to manage security context loss and recover a locked-in secure
installation without the server administrator having to modify manually each clients of the
deployment. This recovery process allows forcing clients to forget a specific CTL and go back to initial
start-up (e.g. trust on first use mode if enabled). The solution relies on the following principles:
Precondition:
➢ The vendor manages a recovery key and its associated digital certificate, which is trusted
natively by vendor clients (VoIP phones). This digital certificate is dedicated to TLS
recovery procedures. This so-called recovery key remains under full control of the vendor
and is not distributed to any third party, including the customers.
On loss of trust chain:
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➢ The network administrator (i.e. customer or installer) must retrieve a fingerprint
provided by client devices that describes the security context they are stuck with, i.e. the
old and lost CTL. This action is performed by providing information obtained from the
current CTL passed through cryptographic function that delivers a hash and signed
fingerprint. This output information can be accessed by any means on a given device of
the installation (this info is read-only and does not have to be protected by admin
password, as considered not sensitive).
➢ The network administrator connects and authenticates on the vendor support service
platform, so that the vendor is able to ensure the administrator is an allowed customer
requester. This is also used for operation traceability purposes.
➢ The network administrator (i.e. customer or installer) provides the information to vendor
support services, e.g. with a dedicated web services requiring the administrator to
register, or by sharing thru any out of band method (e.g. mail, phone).
➢ The vendor uses its secret recovery key to sign with asymmetric cryptography the
fingerprint input. The resulting information is denoted as the recovery token. The
recovery token is then sent back to the network administrator (i.e. customer or installer).
➢ The recovery token is installed on the server to be deployed with available provisioning
mechanisms that allow mass distribution services to the clients (e.g. it can be inserted as
an optional parameter of the configuration file that devices automatically download at
startup).
➢ Clients receive the recovery token from provisioning and verify the signature of the
recovery token with asymmetric cryptography procedures and the embedded public
vendor recovery key. The fingerprint of the locally stored CTL is compared to the one of
the underlying recovery token. If matching occurs, the client allows erasing the locally
stored CTL and gets back to an initial state allowing reconfiguring the security of the
device.
The following diagram depicts the procedure as implemented in this solution with VoIP
phones as clients and PBX as server:
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